Delgado v. Araguz: A Trial Court’s Medical Opinion and the Constitutional Injury that Results.

Abel C. Ramirez Jr., Southern Methodist University

Abstract

In the state of Texas, “a marriage between persons of the same sex is not legally recognized, and will be rendered void.” Therefore, a marriage license will only be issued to a couple that consists of one person who fits within the exclusive gender category of “male” and one person who fits within the exclusive gender category of “female.” Traditionally, “gender” has been determined by a singular method – one’s genitalia at birth. However, what if it isn’t that simple? What if a person is born without a distinct gender (a person who is neither distinctly male, nor distinctly female)? Who is this person allowed to marry? Unfortunately, Texas law does not directly answer this question. However, a Texas District Court has determined whom such persons are NOT allowed to marry.

This article reviews, from a Constitutional and Civil Rights perspective, the Texas court’s reasoning for denying the validity of a marriage between a man, and a person who was born without a distinct gender. It also considers the potential and hypothetical arguments of the parties involved, should the case progress to the United States Supreme Court.