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Article
Implementing the First Best in an Agency Relationship with Renegotiation: A Corrigendum
Econometrica (2001)
  • Aaron S. Edlin
  • Benjamin Hermalin
Abstract
The proof in Proposition 4 in Hermalin and Katz (1991) is incorrect because it fails to check post-renegotiation utilities against the incentive compatibility constraints. This note states and proves a comparable proposition with a slightly stronger assumption regarding the monotonicity of bargaining. This result vindicates the central intuition of Hermalin and Katz about the potential insignificance of the observable, but unverifiable distinction in contracting.
Disciplines
Publication Date
July, 2001
Citation Information
Aaron S. Edlin and Benjamin Hermalin. "Implementing the First Best in an Agency Relationship with Renegotiation: A Corrigendum" Econometrica Vol. 69 (2001)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/aaron_edlin/17/